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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE
HALLADAY,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No. 18032

vs.
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW
and NORMA G. BIGELOW,
DefendantsRespondents.

REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT MUTUAL
ACQUIESCENCE BY ADJOINING LANDOWNERS FOR
A LONG PERIOD OF YEARS.
Over the years, this court has issued a great number and
variety of decisions dealing with the issue of boundary by
acquiescence.

As noted by Chief Justice Henriod, these

decisions have "produced a Joseph's Coat of many colors"
respecting the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

In more

recent opinions, this court has commonly set forth four
elements which establish a presumption that a certain line has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

become a boundary by acquiescence.

Those four elements are:

(1) occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by
monuments, fences, or buildings and (2) acquiescence in the
line as a boundary (3) for a long period of years (4) by
adjoining landowners.

P. 2d 143 (1964).

Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389

If the party claiming boundary by acquiescence

cannot establish all of these four elements, there can be no
boundary by acquiescence.
The requirement that there be adjoining landowners is one
of common sense.

A third party cannot be deprived of his

property by the agreement or acquiescence of neighboring
parties.

Any such ouster must result by compliance with the

requirements of adverse possession.
Only in the "rarest of cases" will the court establish a
boundary by acquiescence where the period of acquiescence is
less than 20 years.

King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 P. 2d

893 (1963); Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P. 2d 792
(Utah 1975).
Acquiescence has been variously defined by the court.
Essentially, if a party has acquiesced in a certain line as a
boundary for more than 20 years, the court implies an agreement
that the boundary between the respective parties' properties
shall be fixed at that point.
agreement is not conclusive.

Obviously, such an implied
A party may rebut such a presump-

tion by evidence that there was no agreement or that there
could not have been a proper agreement between the parties.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Wright v. Clissold, 521 P. 2d 1224 (Utah 1974).

Furthermore,

any such agreement would be void and unenforceable if the true
boundary is known and the agreement does not result from the
settlement of a dispute as to the correct boundary.

Otherwise,

the statute of frauds relating to the transfer of real property
would be violated.

Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P. 912

(Utah 1929).

Subsequent to the filing of plaintiffs' earlier brief,
this court issued its opinion in Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P. 2d
726 (Utah 1981) wherein the court stated:
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has
long been recognized, and when the location of the
true boundary between adjoining tracts of land is
unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners
thereof may, by parol agreement, establish the
boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and their grantees. However, when the true
boundary is known, any parol agreement of the
owners establishing the boundary elsewhere is void
and unenforceable by virtue of the statute of
frauds, which requires a conveyance of real property
to be in writing.
This court has determined that in the absence of
an express agreement as to the location of the
boundary between adjoining owners, the law will
imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located,
if it can do so consistently with the facts appearing. However, when the evidence fails to supportany implication that a fence has been erected by
adjoining owners pursuant to an agreement between
them as to the location of the boundary, the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has no application.
639 P. 2d at 728, 729.
Plaintiffs have set forth their theory with respect to
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence in their prior brief.
In this brief, plaintiffs will attempt to respond only to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

allegations raised in defendants' briefs.

Plaintiffs concede

that there is an ancient fence which has been in existence for
more than 50 years and that none of the parties know the reason
for its being built.

Plaintiffs also acknowledge that defendants

Cluff and Bigelow have on various occasions occupied property
within the disputed P-N-M-0 area on Appendix A.

However,

assertions made in defendants' briefs with respect to the other
three requirements for establishing a presumption of boundary by
acquiescence, are not correct.
Defendant Cluff bases her argument almost entirely on the
proposition that the parties recognized the M-N fence as a
boundary between their respective properties.

Defendant Cluff

makes many assertions which appear to be incorrect restatements
of the testimony.

At pages 5 and 6 of defendant Cluff's brief

it is asserted that the fence line M-Y and the fence line M-N is
a continuation of the fence line around the property formerly
owned by Madge Cluff's father, Mr. Durnell, and was for the
purpose of establishing the property line between the Halladays
and the Durnells.

However, what Mr. Elmo Halladay actually

testified was as follows:

Q.

So those fence lines between points "M" and
"N" and points "X" and "Y" on Exhibit 8 have
been there at least 50 years?

A.

Easy.

Q.

And maybe before?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, what was the purpose of this old fence
that runs between point "X" and point "Y" on
plaintiffs' Exhibit 8?

I would say around 50 years, yes.
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A.

That divided the property between our
place and, I think, Brother Durnell, who
owned it at that time. That was Madge's
father.

Q.

Did you ever speak with anybody about
any kind of problem related to that fence
line?

A.

No, we never had no problems then. We
was always very good friends all the time.
We was very good friends.

(R. 162-263).

Clearly, Elmo Halladay was testifying with respect to the
X-Y fence line and not the M-N fence line involved in this
appeal.
fence.

The X-Y fence line divided the property, not the M-N
Furthermore, it was the X-Y fence line that he was

referring to when he said there was no dispute about the
fence.
Defendant Cluff then cites a statement by plaintiff Mack
Halladay that when he bought the Boardman piece, parcel 1 on
Appendix A,

he intended to occupy to the M-N fence line.

(Respondent's Brief p. 9).

However, defendant Cluff does not

indicate to the court that when plaintiff Halladay purchased
the Boardman piece, (1965) that plaintiff Halladay had already
purchased the A-B-C-D property from Mayor Collard (1958) and
therefore he owned the property up to the fence line.

Defendant

Cluff's quotation from the record is clearly not accurate and
is intended to have the court believe that plaintiff Halladay
purchased the Boardman piece with the intent of occupying to
the fence line without actually receiving a deed to the
property below the fenceline.

However, plaintiff Halladay
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already owned that property.
Both defendants Cluff and Bigelow further attempt to show
that plaintiffs acquiesced in the M-N fence as a boundary by
alleging that plaintiffs purchased the A-B-C-D property for
the purpose of clearing title to the land already owned by
plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' reason for purchasing the A-B-C-D

parcel has absolutely nothing to do with acquiescence in the
M-N fence as a boundary line.

Plaintiff or his father already

held record title up to the fence line prior to purchasing the
P-M-N-0 property from Mayor Collard.

By purchasing that

property, plaintiffs not only cleared up whatever record title
problems they may have had, but also purchased additional
ground.

At the time plaintiffs purchased the A-B-C-D property,

defendant Perry Bigelow testified that plaintiff Mack Halladay
told him that he had purchased property in Mr. Bigelow's
backyard. (R. 277).

Plaintiff Halladay knew that he was

purchasing property beyond the M-N fence line.
Defendants have cited no testimony or evidence in the
record indicating any affirmative acquiescence by plaintiffs
with respect to the M-N fence line, and plaintiffs have been
unable to find any such evidence in the record:

There is

evidence that at the time plaintiffs purchased the property
from Mayor Collard and that during the ten year period immediately preceding trial, plaintiff informed defendant Bigelow
that he owned the property and that defendant Bigelow should
not do anything with it.

Furthermore, in 1978 plaintiff Halladay
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prevented Perry Bigelow from building a potato cellar on the
property.

(R. 178, 277-278).

Although defendants cite Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 1199,
505 P. 2d 1199 (19730) for the proposition that acquiescence
is more akin to indolence or inaction, essentially such
indolence is found to form an implied agreement that the
parties recognize a particular line as a boundary.

To constitutE

a valid agreement which does not run afoul of the statute of
frauds, there must be a dispute or uncertainty as to the
correct boundary between the parties' respective properties.
In the present case, there is neither dispute nor uncertainty
as to the correct boundary, nor is there a basis to find an
agreement between the parties.

It i1 undisputed that the

record titles of defendants Bigelow and Cluff do not include
the P-M-N-0 parcel.

When he purchased the P-M-N-0 property in

1958, plaintiff Mack Halladay knew that that boundary extended
beyond the fence line and he so informed Perry Bigelow.
The testimony appears to be undisputed that defendant Cluff
and plaintiff Halladay have never had any discussion with
respect to the M-N fence as a boundary between their properties
prior to the initiation of this lawsuit.

v.

According to Madsen

Clegg, supra, any implied agreement between defendant Cluff

and plaintiffs that the M-N fence is a boundary runs afoul of
the statute of frauds and is void.
Furthermore, for a presumption of boundary by acquiescence
to arise, the alleged boundary must be between adjoining
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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landowners and there must be mutual acquiescence in the
boundary for a long period of years, usually in excess of 20
years.

Until 1958, plaintiffs were not adjoining landowners

to defendants, at least as to the M-N property line.

Until

1961, plaintiffs did not own any property north of defendant
Cluff's property other than the disputed parcel.
transcript of February 5, 1981, page 18).

(Trial

In 1975, defendant

Cluff and defendants Bigelow were involved in litigation with
each other as to the east-west boundary between their properties.
At that time, defendant Cluff had prepared a plat of the
property lines which indicated that her north boundary was
approximately 50 feet short of the M-N fence line.
February 25, 1981 Transcript, p. 18, Ex. 13).

(R. 232,

Thus, even if

there was acquiescence by plaintiffs in the M-N fence as a
boundary line, such acquiescence was not between adjoining
landowners for a long period of years.
Plaintiffs further argue that the real purpose of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is to settle land titles.
On the other hand, it is the established law of this jurisdiction
that one cannot transfer property by parol agreement. "Land
cannot be conveyed from one person to another by merely a
change in possession, even though such change in possession
continues.for a long period of time."
at 918.

Tripp v. Bagley, supra,

In their present case, plaintiffs knew that the M-N

fence was not the boundary of their property and they so
informed defendant Perry Bigelow when they purchased it.

This
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is not a case wherein the parties are in dispute as to the
location of the true boundary and agree that a certain line
shall become the boundary between the respective properties.
In this case, plaintiffs owned to the M-N fenceline, they
subsequently purchased ground south of the M-N f enceline, and
now defendants are attempting to obtain title to the property
subsequently purchased by plaintiffs.

"When the true boundary

is known, any parol agreement of the owners establishing the
boundary elsewhere is void and unenforceable by virtue of the
statute of frauds, which requires a conveyance of real property
to be in writing."
Bagley, supra.

Madsen v. Clegg, supra, citing Tripp v.

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence

therefore has no application to the present case and the
judgment of the lower court should be reversed with respect
to the P-M-N-0 property.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is clearly not
applicable to the facts of this case.

The evidence shows

that plaintiffs have never affirmatively acquiesced in the
M-N fence as a boundary line, and thus any showing of acquiescence must result from plaintiff's nonuse of the property.
Any implied agreement that plaintiffs accepted the M-N fence as a
boundary line is rebutted by the evidence which shows that as to
defendant Cluff there was never any dispute or uncertainty as to
the boundary and with respect to defendants Bigelow, plaintiff
affirmatively told said defendants on many occasions that he
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judgment with respect to the P-M-N-0 property and quiet title to
that property in plaintiffs.
Dated:

July

.E::,

1982.
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